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FINANCING THE SMALL CREDIT RISK CORPORATION
UNDER SECTION 302(b)(1): A REJECTION OF
THE MEANINGFUL REDUCTION TEST
INTRODUCTION
A decade ago in United States v. Davis,' the Supreme Court held that a
distribution by a corporation to a shareholder in partial redemption of his
stock will always be taxed as a dividend unless the redemption results in a
meaningful reduction in the sharehqlder's proportionate interest in the corpo-
ration. 2 Although this mechanical "meaningful reduction" test promotes judi-
cial economy, 3 it has also had a serious effect on shareholders of closely held
corporations4 who are often forced to finance the business. These shareholders
advance funds with the understanding that the corporation will later return
the money by means of a redemption.- The redemption of stock for this
purpose, however, generally will not result in a reduction of the shareholder's
interest in the corporation. 6 It would not meet the specific requirements of
sections 302(b)(2) or (3) of the Internal Revenue Code,7 and also would not
qualify under the Davis test. The amount distributed in exchange for the stock
would therefore be taxed as a dividend under section 301.8 It has been
suggested that these distributions represent nothing more than a return of
capital and that to tax them as dividends is a bizarre result mandated by the
Davis decision. 9
This Note examines the dilemma faced by shareholders of credit risk closely
held corporations that require financing for valid business purposes. It then
analyzes the Davis decision, concluding that the Court misinterpreted Con-
gress' intent in enacting section 302(b)(1).10 Finally, this Note suggests a new
approach for courts to deal with corporate distributions to a shareholder in
repayment of a financing advance.
I. THE DILEMMA
Closely held corporations often are deemed to be unsound credit risks
because they are too small or too new. As a result, independent lending
1. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
2. Id. at 313.
3. See Albers v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982, 985 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting), denying
cert. to 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.), aff'g 56 T.C. 556 (1971).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Albers v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982, 983 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting),
denying cert. to 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.), aff'g 56 T.C. 556 (1971); United States v. Davis, 397
U.S. 301, 302-03 (1970).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 302-03 (1970); Eberly v. Commissioner, 10
T.C.M. (CCH) 1157, 1164-65 (1951); Allen v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 206, 212 (1940).
7. I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(2), (3).
8. I.R.C. § 301.
9. Albers v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982, 984 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting), denying cert. to
474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.), aff'g 56 T.C. 556 (1971).
10. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1).
11. Hearings on HR. 8300 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 332
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] (statement of Colin F. Stam).
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institutions are reluctant to extend credit to them.' 2 The shareholder, there-
fore, may be forced to lend the funds needed for the corporation's daily
business operations. 13 Alternatively, he may temporarily advance funds to
increase the working capital of the corporation and to reduce its credit risk,
thereby inducing outside institutions to make loans to the corporation.t 4 The
determination of a court as to whether the transaction between the share-
holder and the corporation is debt or equity will have a crucial effect on
the tax consequences resulting from the advance."5 The principal disadvan-
tage to an equity label is that corporate distributions in repayment of an
equity advance are taxed to the shareholder as dividends and treated as
ordinary income.16 In contrast, the repayment of a debt advance may be tax
free if it is viewed as a return of capital. 17
Shareholders have employed three approaches in attempting to avoid the
dividend tax associated with the repayment of an equity advance. First, they
have induced independent lending institutions to make loans to the corpora-
tion by personally guaranteeing the corporate debt.' 8 Second, they have
advanced funds to the corporation, labelling them as debt. 19 Third, assuming
the advance represents equity, they have labelled the corporate distributions
in repayment of the advance as a stock redemption. Under section 302(b)(1) of
the Internal Revenue Code, 20 a stock redemption is taxed at favorable capital
gains rates, rather than as ordinary income. 2
12. Id.
13. Id. at 332-33; see, e.g., Sorem v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 275, 277 l10th Cir- 1964);
Herzog v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1595. 1599 (1963); Smith v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.
476, 483 (1968); Estate of Goiwynne v. Commissioner, 26 TC. 1209. 1211 (1956).
14. Lending institutions generally have been more willing to advance loans to credit risk
closely held corporations if the shareholder agrees to maintain a higher level of corporate working
capital throughout the life of the loan. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 397 U.S 301. 302-03
(1970); McFarlane v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 467. 470 (1954), Eberlv v. Commissioner,
10 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157, 1164-65 (1951); Monk v. Commissioner, 6 T C.M. tCCH 1015. 1016
(1947).
15. See J. Mertens 4A, The Law of Federal Income Taxation, §§ 26 04a. 26 06, 26- 10 trev.
ed. 1979); Corporate Capitalization: What are the factors used to determine nature of investment,
11 Tax. for Accountants 356 (Dec. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Capitalization .
16. Corporate Capitalization, supra note 15, at 356.
17. Id. Another principal advantage to labelling an advance as debt is that the interest
payments on debt obligations are deductible by the corporation. Id.
18. See, e.g., Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 529-30 list Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); Plantation Patterns. Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712, 724
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); Blum v. Commissioner. 59 T.C. 436, 437 (1972).
Smyers v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 189, 192 (1971). See generally notes 22-29 infra and accom-
panying text.
19. See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694. 696 (3d Cir. 1968); P.M.
Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir. 1962); Wilbur Sec. Co. v. Commissioner,
279 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1960); Du Gro Frozen Foods, Inc. v. United States. 73-1 U S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9164, at 80,215 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd per curia,, 481 F.2d 171 (5th Cir- 1973)_
See generally notes 31-39 infra and accompanying text.
20. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301. 303 (1970); Sorem v- Commissioner, 334
1980]
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A. Shareholder Guarantees
A "good credit" shareholder can reduce the corporation's credit risk and
thereby induce outside lending institutions to advance loans by "personally
guaranteeing" the loan. 22 The shareholder can argue that repayment of the
loan by the corporation should not be taxed to him as a dividend because
there is never any distribution of property from the corporation to the
shareholder. 23
In recent years, however, the Internal Revenue Sevice (IRS) has challenged
these transactions, arguing that their substance should control over their
form.2 4 The IRS has contended that, in substance, these shareholder guaran-
tees represent an indirect contribution to capital: the lending institution con-
structively lends the money to the shareholder who constructively advances
the funds to the corporation as equity.25 When the corporation repays the
"loan" to the lending institution it is in effect making a distribution to the
shareholder-a dividend under section 316 .26 The shareholder is then actually
repaying his loan to the independent lending institution. 27 Faced with these
arguments, courts have applied the traditional tests for distinguishing debt
from equity28 in order to determine whether there was a bona fide loan by the
F.2d 275, 280-81 (Oth Cir. 1964); Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651, 657 (1st Cir. 1954). See generally
notes 40-73 infra and accompanying text.
22. Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 529-30 (1st Cir. 1976), cerl.
denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712, 724 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); Blum v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436, 437 (1972);
Smyers v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 189, 192 (1971). See generally B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal
Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 4. 10, at 4-40-43 (4th ed. 1979).
23. See, e.g., Ackerson v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 475 (W.r Ky. 1967); Princess Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.W. Va. 1965). In addition, the corporation's
repayment of Ehe loan to the lending institution should not be characterized as a dividend
representing the release of the shareholder's legal obligation to repay the loan because under the
guarantee agreement the shareholder's legal obligation to repay does not arise until the corpora-
tion defaults. When there is no default, the shareholder's legal obligation to repay never arises
and thus cannot be released. Princess Coals, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. at 411-12. See
also Kobacker v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 882, 893 (1962).
24. The concept of substance over form has been applied in many areas of the tax law. For
instance, when a shareholder makes an advance to a corporation labelled as debt, the courts will
deem it as equity if that is the substance of the transaction. See B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra
note 22, 4.02, at 4-5-7. Substance is also crucial in the determination of ownership of stock. Id.
1 9.21 at 9-10-12, 9.30, at 9-36-37. A stock redemption which in form is a sale of stock by the
shareholder to the corporation will be treated as a dividend if in substance the transaction is
essentially equivalent to a dividend. Id. 9.01, at 9-2-3.
25. Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 550 (1968); see Blum v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436, 439 (1972).
26. Section 316 defines a dividend as a distribution by a corporation to a shareholder to the
extent of earnings and profits. I.R.C. § 316(a). Section 316 creates an irrebuttable presumption
that every distribution by a corporation is first out of earnings and profits and only when there are
no earnings and profits can a distribution be a return of equity. See B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra
note 22, $ 7.02, at 7-8.
27. Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1967); Ackerson v.
United States, 277 F. Supp. 475, 476-77 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
28. Smyers v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 189, 198 (1971); 5ee Murphy Logging Co. v. United
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independent lending institution to the corporation or a constructive equity
advance by the shareholder to the closely held corporation. Through the
application of these tests, Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the
shareholder guarantees represent constructive equity contributions.2 9 The
repayment of the loans by the corporation, therefore, would be taxed to the
shareholder as a dividend. 30 Thus, shareholder guarantees have been elimi-
nated as a method of financing small closely held corporations.
B. The Advance-Debt or Equity
Shareholders of small corporations have also attempted to avoid the divi-
dend tax by labelling their advance as debt, the repayment of which is not
taxable as a dividend. 31 Courts, however, closely scrutinize shareholder
States, 378 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1967); Fors Farms, Inc. v. United States. 66-1 U S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9206, at 85,359 (W.D. Wash. 1966). "The determination of whether advances by
stockholders to a closely held corporation are debts or contributions to capital must be based on a
wide variety of considerations. The factors to be considered in such a case have been enumerated
as follows: (1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness, (2) the presence or
absence of a maturity date; (3) the source of the payments; (4) the right to enforce the payment of
the principal and interest; (5) participation in management; (6) a status equal to or inferior to that
of regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) 'thin' or adequate capitalization; (9)
identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (10) payment of interest only out of dividend
money; (11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions- (12) the
extent to which the initial advances were used to acquire capital assets; (13) the failure of the
debtor to pay on the due date or to seek postponement." Du Gro Frozen Foods, Inc. v. United
States, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CC) 9164, at 80,214 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (citation omitted), aff'd per
curiam, 481 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1973); see Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844, 847-48 (Sth Cir.
1969).
The application of all the debt-equity tests to the problem of shareholder guarantees confuses
the issue because at the same time the courts attempt to decide two distinct issues: (1) whether the
lending institution was actually advancing funds to the corporation or constructively advancing
funds to the shareholder, and (2) assuming there is a constructive shareholder advance, whether
the nature of the advance was debt or equity. Most of the debt-equity tests are irrelevant in
determining whether the independent lending institution was dealing with the shareholder or the
corporation. They only become relevant in determining the nature of the shareholder's construc-
tive advance when it is decided that the lender was constructively advancing the loan to the
shareholder. A two-step process, therefore, should be used to deal with the problem of share-
holder guarantees. The first step focuses solely on whether the lending institution was actually
advancing the funds to the corporation, relying on its credit as security for repayment, or whether
the lending institution was in fact dealing with the shareholder and made the loan solely on the
basis of the shareholder's credit position. The only relevant inqui.ry is whether any lender would
have made a similar loan to the credit risk corporation without the shareholder guarantee. If the
answer to this inquiry is affirmative, a valid loan by the lending institution to the corporation
should be held to exist, even if all the other debt-equity tests indicate otherwise. If the answer to
the inquiry is negative, courts should apply step two, that is, all the other debt-equity tests, to
determine whether the constructive advance by the shareholder to the corporation represents debt
or equity.
29. Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 533-35 (1st Cir. 1976) crt.
denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712, 719-24
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); see B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 22, 4.10,
at 4-41 to 42.
30. See note 26 supra.
31. Corporate Capitalization, supra note 15, at 356. A distribution by a corporation will only
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advances to determine the true character of the investment.32 The overriding
consideration in distinguishing debt from equity is whether the shareholder
was looking for the best return on his investment, regardless of benefit to the
corporation. A shareholder looking primarily for the best return on his money
is more likely to be deemed a creditor, while one seeking primarily to benefit
the corporation is more likely to be deemed to have made an additional
contribution to equity. 33 An arms length creditor would not subordinate his
loan,3 4 would charge a high rate of interest, "5 and would probably require
collateral in the event of default. 36 Because a shareholder of a close corpora-
tion often advances funds to upgrade the corporation's credit position, he is
inclined to subordinate his advance 37 and to charge a relatively low rate of
interest. 38 Under these circumstances, regardless of what the parties label the
be taxed as a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits. I.R.C. §§ 316, 301. Throughout this
Note it will be assumed that there are sufficient earnings and profits to cover the distribution.
32. S.P. Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 764, 766-68 (1968); Lynch v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C. 990, 991-92, aff'd, 273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1959); 4A J. Mertens, supra note
15, § 26.04a.
33. Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572, 581 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1943); Jaeger Auto Fin. Co. v,
Nelson, 191 F. Supp. 693, 696-97 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Abrams v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH)
1546, 1551 (1964); 4A J. Mertens, supra note 15, § 26.06, at 39-40.
34. When an arms length creditor makes an advance that is risky, he will look for maximum
protection to insure that he will be repaid. He will not make his rights to repayment inferior to
the rights of general creditors. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder Bros. Co., 367 F.2d 980, 985
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 956 (1967); Diamond Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d
725, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1963); Charter Wire, Inc. v. United States 309 F.2d 878, 879 (7th Cir,
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963); P.M. Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 786,
789-90 (3d Cir. 1962); Oak Hill Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 419, 432 (1963).
35. Interest rates are generally a function of relative risk. J. Van Home, Fundamentals of
Financial Management 330 (2d ed. 1974). Therefore, when an arms length creditor makes a loan
to a high risk corporation, he would charge a high rate of interest. If the courts find that the
interest rate is not sufficiently high, they will hold that the advance is equity. Compare
Scriptomatic, Inc., v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (7% rate of interest
held to be that which arms length creditor would have required given credit risk of corporation),
aff'd, 555 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1977) with S.P. Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 764,
767 (1968) (5% held not to be that which creditor would have required).
36. An arms length creditor would probably take steps to insure that he will be repaid for
loans made to a credit risk corporation. One method generally used to insure the repayment of a
loan is to take collateral. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder Bros. Co., 367 F,2d 980 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 956 (1967); National Say. & Trust Co. v. United States, 285 F.
Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1968); A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 164 (C.D. Cal. 1968),
aff'd, 424 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1970).
37. An advance which is subordinate to the rights of general creditors will be much more
effective in reducing the credit risk of the corporation. Since a primary motive for the advance is
often the reduction of this credit risk, shareholders have been strongly motivated to subordinate
their advances. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder Bros. Co., 367 F.2d 980, 981 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 956 (1967); Diamond Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 725, 727 (3d
Cir. 1963); Charter Wire, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 878, 879 (7th Cir. 1962); P.M.
Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 786, 787-88 (3d Cir. 1962); Oak Hill Fin. Co. v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C. 419, 434 (1963).
38. If the corporation requires the funds for valid business purposes, both the shareholder and
the corporation would prefer that the funds remain within the corporation rather than be paid out
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advance, the advancer is clearly acting as a shareholder and not as a creditor.
Therefore, the majority of advances by shareholders to credit risk closely held
corporations have been held to be equity.
39
C. Repayment of Equity Advance-Dividend or Valid Stock Redemption
Generally, sections 316 and 30140 govern distributions from a corporation
to a shareholder. Section 316 raises an irrebuttable presumption 4' that every
distribution is out of earnings and profits and thus taxed as a dividend under
section 301, unless another Code section provides a different result.42 Section
302(b)(1) provides an exception if the redemption distribution is "not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend.14 3 Shareholders of small corporations have
argued that the distribution by the corporation in repayment of the equity
advance is not essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(1) and
thus taxable only on the excess of the repayment over the advance, at capital
gains rates.
4 4
This approach has caused much controversy. Initially, the argument is
based on a problematic concept. When one individual sells stock to another in
exchange for property, the transaction is characterized as a sale of a capital
asset and the seller is taxed on the gain at capital gains rates.4" A stock
redemption is conceptually difficult 46 because it is a sale of stock by a
shareholder to the corporation that originally issued it in exchange for
property. On one hand, the transaction could be characterized as a sale of a
capital asset because it is the sale of stock by one legal entity to another in
to the shareholder as interest. This often motivates shareholders to charge a low rate of interest
on the advance. See, e.g., S.P. Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 764, 767 (1968)
(no prudent businessman would have risked charging only 5% interest on an advance).
39. There are several tests which courts apply in determining whether an advance represents
debt or equity. See note 28 supra. When these tests have been applied to shareholder advances to
their credit risk closely held corporations, most of these tests indicate that the advance repreents
equity. Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572. 583 (5th Cir. 1977). Restland
Mem. Park v. United States, 509 F.2d 187, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1975); Midland Distrib., Inc. v.
United States, 481 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1973); Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d
694, 699 (3d Cir. 1968); Wilbur Sec. Co. v. Commissioner. 279 F.2d 657. 662 (9th Cir+ 1960);
O.H. Kruse Grain & Milling v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 123, 126 (9th Cir. 1960); Gilbert v.
Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 409 (2d Cir. 1957); Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner. 236
F.2d 159, 165 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957); Du Gro Frozen Foods. Inc. v.
United States, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T 9164, at 80,215 (N.D. Ga. 1972). qtrdper curiam. 481
F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1973); S.P. Realty Co. v. Commissioner. 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 764. 767 (1968);
Matthiessen v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 781, 787 (1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 659 (2d Cir 19521.
40. I.R.C. §§ 316, 301.
41. B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 22, T 7.02, at 7-8.
42. Section 316(a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, every distribution
is made out of earnings and profits to the extent thereof." I.R.C § 316ta).
43. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1).
44. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 305-07 (1970); Sorem v Commissioner. 334 F 2d
275, 280-81 (10th Cir. 1964); Keefe v. Cote. 213 F.2d 651. 657 (1st Cir 1954)
45. Stock is a capital asset. I.R.C. § 1221. Capital gains treatment applies only to the 'sale or
exchange of a capital asset." I.R.C. § 1222(1). (3).
46. Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964); B. Bittker & J Eustice. supra
note 22, 'r 9.01.
1980]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
exchange for property. 47 On the other hand, the transaction could be charac-
terized as a dividend because it involves the distribution of property by a
corporation to a shareholder.
48
Congress has attempted to give these transactions a more definite char-
acter. The Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1926 provided that stock redemp-
tions would be treated as a sale unless the distribution was "essentially
equivalent to a dividend."'49 The essentially equivalent language was only
intended to apply when there was no valid business purpose for the transac-
tion other than a tax avoidance motive.5 0 The provision was also included in
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. s5 When applying this provision to specific
facts, however, courts disagreed on the proper interpretation of the language.
5 2
Most courts adopted a business purpose test, holding that no redemption
would be essentially equivalent to a dividend unless there was no valid
business purpose for the redemption other than a tax avoidance motive." A
47. B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 22, 9.01, at 9-2 to 3.
48. Id. at 9-3.
49. The Revenue Act of 1921 provided: "A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax but if
after the distribution of any such dividend the corporation proceeds to cancel or redeem its stock
at such time and in such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption
essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount received in redemp-
tion or cancellation of the stock shall be treated as a taxable dividend." Revenue Act of 1921,
Pub. L. No. 57-98, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 227, 228-29 (current version at I.R.C. § 302). The Revenue
Act of 1926 made § 201(d) applicable "(whether or not such stock was issued as a stock dividend),
at such time and in such manner as to make the . . . redemption in whole or in part essentially
equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend." Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20,
§ 201(g), 44 Stat. 9, 11 (current version at I.R.C. § 302).
50. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1970); see Levin, Stock Redemptions Under
IRC Sections 302, 303, and 304, 80 Dick. L. Rev. 434, 448 (1975).
51. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 1, 48 (current version at
I.R.C. § 302). "If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock . . . at such time and in such manner
as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially
equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed . . . shall be
treated as a taxable dividend." Id.
52. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 309 (197(0).
53. Sorem v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 275, 280-81 (10th Cir. 1964); United States v. Carey,
289 F.2d 531, 538-39 (8th Cir. 1961); Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651, 657 (1st Cir. 1954); Smith v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C. 476, 483 (1968); Estate of Golwynne v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 1209,
1212-13 (1956); Upham v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1120, 1127 (1945); Rosania v. Commissioner, 15
T.C.M. (CCH) 580, 584-85 (1956); McFarlane v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 467, 470
(1954); Sagner v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 1355, 1357 (1953); Eberly v. Commissioner,
10 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157, 1165 (1951); Smith v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 1124, 1130
(1951); Monk v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 1015, 1020-21 (1947); Allen v. Commissioner,
41 B.T.A. 206, 212 (1940); Koch v. Commissioner, 26 B T.A. 1025, 1027 (1932). It should be
noted that some of these courts referred to the test as the "flexible net effects test."
In United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), the Court noted that at first § 115(g)(1) of the
1939 Code was interpreted as only applying to tax avoidance schemes, and that although the
focus later changed to the effect of the distribution, many courts continued to rely on a valid
business purpose as evidence that the transaction was not essentially equivalent to a dividend. Id.
at 309. See also B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 22, 9.02, at 9-5; Chommie, Section
346(a)(2): The Contraction Theory, 11 Tax. L. Rev. 407, 411 (1956).
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minority adopted the strict net effects test5 4 under which a transaction could
be characterized as a dividend, regardless of motive, if there were a pro rata
distribution of funds by the corporation to the shareholder that caused no
change in the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation."
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that a stock redemption will
be treated as a sale or exchange of a captial asset if the redemption is "not
essentially equivalent to a dividend" under section 302(b)(1).1 6 The circuit
courts continued their split on the proper interpretation of the essentially
equivalent language, s" and in 1970 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
United States v. Daviss8 to clarify the meaning of this confusing phrase.
In Davis, the taxpayer owned 100% of the stock in his corporation through
the attribution rules.5 9 The corporation needed additional funds for its daily
operations and could not obtain independent financing because it was deemed
a credit risk. 60 The corporation was offered a loan if it increased its working
capital by $25,000 and maintained this level throughout the life of the loan. 6'
The taxpayer therefore advanced the money in exchange for 1000 shares of
preferred stock which, it was understood, would be redeemed upon the
repayment of the loan.62 Immediately after the corporation repaid the loan it
redeemed the preferred stock. 63 The IRS claimed that the distribution of the
$25,000 was a taxable dividend under sections 316 and 301.64 Davis con-
tended that the valid business purpose for the redemption and the absence of
a tax avoidance scheme placed the redemption under the protection of section
54. Only the Second Circuit had unequivocally adopted the strict net effects test under which
the valid business motives for the redemption are completely irrelevant. Levin v. Commissioner,
385 F.2d 521, 526 (2d Cir. 1967); Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir.}, cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 834 (1965); see United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 303-04 n.2 (1970). In
ascertaining whether the distribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend, some courts looked
at the effect of the transaction rather than the taxpayer's motive. In all these cases the
redemptions which were exactly pro rata were held to be essentially equivalent to a dividend.
Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607, 609 (5th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Roberts, 203 F.2d
304, 307 (4th Cir. 1953); Boyle v. Commissioner. 187 F.2d 557, 560 (3d Cir.). cert. denied, 342
U.S. 817 (1951); Smith v. United States, 121 F.2d 692, 695 (3d Cir. 1941); Flanagan v.
Helvering, 116 F.2d 937, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
55. Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811, 813. (2d Cir.). cert denied, 382 U S. 834
(1965); Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964).
56. I.R-C. § 302(b)(1).
57. Compare Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967) and Wiseman v United
States, 371 F.2d 816 (Ist Cir. 1967) and Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 834 (1965) (applying the strict net effects test) with Commissioner v. Beren-
baum, 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1966) and Ballenger v. United States. 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962)
and United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958) (applying the business purpose test)u
58. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
59. Id. at 304-07. The Court held that the attribution rules of I.IRC § 318. apply to
§ 302(b)(1) redemptions. 397 U.S. at 304-07. Thus, the stocks owned by Davis' wife and children
were attributed to him. Id. at 305-07.
60. Id. at 302.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 302-03.




302(b)(1) and was therefore not taxable as a dividend. 65
The Supreme Court interpreted the legislative history behind section
302(b)(1) of the 1954 Code as rejecting the business purpose test.66 The Court
held instead that no redemption qualifies for capital gains treatment under
section 302(b)(1) unless it results in a "meaningful reduction of the sharehold-
er's proportionate interest in the corporation. '67 Because Davis owned 100%
of the outstanding stock of the corporation both before and after the redemp-
tion, the transaction did not satisfy the meaningful reduction test, and the
Court held the distribution taxable as a dividend. 68
The Davis decision has had a very unfavorable effect on small corpora-
tions. Generally, when a shareholder advances funds to his credit risk closely
held corporation for valid business financing purposes, the distribution by the
corporation in repayment of the advance does not result in any reduction in
the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation. 69 Prior to the
Davis decision, repayments of such advances for financing purposes would
not be taxed as a dividend because of the valid business purpose for the
transaction. 70 The Davis test ignores any business purpose underlying the
transaction. 71 As a result, any distribution by a corporation to a shareholder in
repayment of an equity advance will be taxed as a dividend. 72
Shareholders of closely held corporations which require financing to meet
business requirements but are too risky to obtain outside financing are now
faced with a perplexing dilemma. They must choose either to advance the
funds and, upon repayment, be taxed as if they had received a dividend, 73 or
refuse to advance the funds, thus jeopardizing the future of the corporation.
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE MEANINGFUL REDUCTION TEST
The present situation is not only inequitable, but also inconsistent with
congressional intent. While courts have correctly analyzed transactions in-
65. Id.
66. Id. at 311-12.
67. Id. at 313.
68. Id.
69. The distribution of property by a corporation to a shareholder in repayment of an earlier
advance which was made for valid business purposes is not normally intended to change the
relationship between the shareholders and the corporation. Rather, it is only intended to repay
the shareholder and keep his relative rights constant. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 397 U.S.
301, 302-03 (1970); Eberly v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. ICCH) 1157, 1164-65 (1951); Allen v,
Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 206, 212 (1940). Therefore, the meaningful reduction test will generally
not be met.
70. The repayments would be a valid stock redemption tinder the business purpose test. See
note 53 supra and accompanying text.
71. 397 U.S. at 312.
72. See note 69 supra. If the distribution does not meet the meaningful reduction test it will
be deemed essentially equivalent to a dividend and taxed as a dividend under §§ 301 and 316.
This results from the operation of § 302(d) which states that "[elxcept as otherwise provided in
this subchapter, if a corporation redeems its stock ... and if subsection (a) of this section does not
apply, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution of property to which section 301
applies." I.R.C. § 302(d).
73. See notes 41-72 supra and accompanying text.
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volving shareholder guarantees and direct advances, 74 the validity of the
Supreme Court's approach in resolving the stock redemption issue is not free
from doubt. 75 It is contended that Congress never intended the result which
Davis dictates.
A. The Senate Conmnittee on Finance
In preparing the 1954 Code, the House of Representatives eliminated the
"essentially equivalent" language and provided only objective tests, setting
forth specific guidelines to determine whether a redemption is to be taxed as a
dividend or as a gain on the sale of a capital asset. 76 The Senate Finance
Committee, citing an example with facts strikingly similar to those in Davis,
7 7
pointed out that the House provisions would have an unfavorable effect on a
small corporation that looks to its shareholders for valid business financing.
Under the House version, the repayment of the shareholders' equity advance
would be taxed as a dividend.78 The Committee recommended that the
Senate reinsert the essentially equivalent language to prevent this result.
79
74. See notes 22-39 supra and accompanying text.
75. Commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with the Davis decision. Levin, supra note
50, at 448-50; Comment, Defining Dividend Equivalency Under Section 302b111, 16 Viii. L.
Rev. 88, 106-07 (1970); Note, United States v. Davis: A Judicial Panacea For Dividend
Equivalency In The Closely-Held Corporation, 31 Ohio St. L.J. 806, 818-19 (1970); Note, Stock
Redemptions Essentially Equivalent To A Dividend, 7 Willamette L.J. 168, 176-80 (1971).
Several Justices of the Supreme Court have also indicated their dissatisfaction. Albers v.
Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982, 985 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas. J , and
Blackmun, J.), denying cert. to 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.), aff'g 56 T.C. 556 (1971)
76. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in [19541 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad
News 4017, 4209-10.
77. Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 332-33 (statement of Colin F. Stam). As in Datis, the
example used by the Committee also involved a distribution to a controlling shareholder in a
repayment of a financing advance. Id.
78. "Under the proposed code, this normal method of financing small corporations is virtually
precluded. The reason is that under section 302 of the bill, if the corporation should redeem [the
shareholder's] preferred stock, while he still holds his 50 percent of the common stock, the
amount he gets in repayment of his preferred stock is treated as a dividend. For the small
corporation, which looks to its common stockholders for preferred stock financing, this section is
a serious roadblock, because of the dividend tax consequences of redemption of the preferred."
Id. at 333.
79. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45, reprinted in 11054] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4621, 4675 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. "Under present law it is not clear when a
stock redemption results in capital gain or ordinary income. Some courts have held that a
distribution disproportionate to the shareholders' ownership of common stock in the corporation
results in capital-gains treatment, but no definite test has developed. While the House bill set
forth definite conditions under which stock may be redeemed at capital-gain rates, these rules
appeared unnecessarily restrictive. . . . Accordingly, your committee follows existing law by
reinserting the general language indicating that a redemption shall be treated as a distribution in
part or full payment in exchange for stock if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend." Id. The Supreme Court in Davis recognized one exception to the meaningful reduction
test. When the redeeming shareholder cannot control when the redemption might be called, every
redemption will qualify under § 302(b)(1). United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 312-13 (19701
The Court based this exception on the Committee Report which stated that the House provisions
were unnecessarily restrictive particularly in the case of a noncontrolling shareholder Id at
310-11. However, the implication of including "particularly" in the Committee Report was to
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Relying on this recommendation, the Senate reinserted section 302(b)(1) into
the 1954 Code. 80 Thus, Davis is inconsistent with the congressional intent
because it dictates the precise result that Congress apparently intended to
avoid by reinserting section 302(b)(1) into the Code.
B. The Senate Report
After noting that "no definite test has developed" to determine when a stock
redemption would receive capital gains treatment,8 the Senate Report stated
that a redemption would qualify if it
is not essentially equivalent to a dividend. The test intended to be incorporated in the
interpretation of § 302(b)(1) is in general that currently employed under section
115 (g)(1) of the 1939 Code. Your committee further intends that in applying this test
for the future that the inquiry will be devoted solely to the question of whether or not
the transaction by its nature may properly be characterized as a sale of stock by the
redeeming shareholder to the corporation. For this purpose the presence or absence of
earnings and profits of the corporation is not material. Example: X, the sole share-
holder of a corporation having no earnings or profits causes the corporation to redeem
half of its stock. [Section 302(b)(1)] does not apply to such redemption notwithstanding
the absence of earnings and profits. The fact that the proceeds of the redemption are
not taxable as ordinary income to X results through application of section 302 (d) and
section 301.82
In Davis, the Supreme Court interpreted the Senate Report as more than a
mere reenactment of prior law. 83
1. The Example
The Court first pointed to the example in the Senate Report 84 as evidence of
congressional intent to reject the business purpose test.8 5 The Court noted
that the example is a pro rata distribution held to be essentially equivalent to
a dividend, that is, the strict net effects test approach.8 6 Although the
example appears to illustrate only the strict net effects test, a closer examina-
tion reveals that it also demonstrates the business purpose test. This is evident
because the example was conspicuous in its failure to include a business
purpose for the redemption. 8 7 Thus, even if the business purpose test were
suggest that the House provisions also were unnecessarily restrictive in other cases to a lesser
degree. The language clearly indicates that the Committee intended to include repayments of
financing advances by corporations to shareholders within the protection of § 302(b)(1). See note
78 supra.
80. Senate Report, supra note 79, at 234, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
4870-71.
81. Id. at 44, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4621. 4675.
82. Id. at 233-34, reprinted in [19541 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4621, 4870-71.
83. 397 U.S. at 310.
84. Senate Report, supra note 79, at 234, reprinted in [19541 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
4621, 4871. "Example: X, the sole shareholder of a corporation having no earnings or profits
causes the corporation to redeem half of its stock. Paragraph (1) does not apply to such
redemption."
85. 397 U.S. at 312.
86. Id. The Second Circuit unequivocally adopted the strict net effects test. See note 54
supra.
87. See note 84 supra. Had the Senate intended to reject the business purpose test it could
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used, section 302(b)(1) would not apply because the transaction represents a
pro rata distribution of funds from the corporation to a shareholder without a
valid business purpose for the redemption. 88 Had the Senate intended to
reject the business purpose test, as the Court suggested, it would have
included a valid business purpose for the redemption within the example. The
omission indicates that there was no such intent.
The Davis Court also interpreted the example to mean that a tax avoidance
scheme is unnecessary for a redemption to be treated as essentially equivalent
to a dividend.8 9 The Court reasoned that if there are no earnings and profits
there cannot be a tax avoidance scheme, and assumed that the purpose for
expressly omitting earnings and profits in the example was to suggest that a
transaction can be essentially equivalent to a dividend without a tax avoid-
ance scheme. 90 It is contended, however, that Congress omitted earnings and
profits from the example only to emphasize their immateriality in making a
section 302(b)(1) determination under these circumstances. A distribution is a
dividend only to the extent of earnings and profits. 9 1 If a corporation has no
earnings and profits any distribution it makes cannot be a dividend.92 This
leads to the conclusion that in the absence of earnings and profits no
distribution can be essentially equivalent to a dividend and section 302(b)(l)
would always apply. Congress, however, omitted earnings and profits from the
example precisely to emphasize that a distribution can be essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend even in the absence of earnings and profits. 9 3 In such cases
the distribution would be governed by section 301(c)(2) 94 rather than section
302(b)(1). Therefore, the two inferences drawn by the Davis Court from the
example are inaccurate.
2. The Meaningful Reduction Test
In developing the meaningful reduction test, the Court first implied that
prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, the inquiry included whether there
was a tax avoidance motive for the redemption." If there were, the transac-
tion would be essentially equivalent to a dividend. 96 The Court then noted
that the 1954 Code dramatically changed prior law by shifting the inquiry
from whether there was a tax avoidance scheme to whether the transaction
have stated in the example that the shareholder caused the corporation to redeem its stock for
valid business purposes. If the Senate had done so, the fact that the distribution was essentially
equivalent to a dividend would clearly indicate that the business purpose test was rejected. In
fact, no business purpose was included within the example. Senate Report, supra note 79, at 234,
reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4871.
88. This has been held to be essentially equivalent to a dividend under the business purpose
test. See cases cited note 53 supra.
89. 397 U.S. at 311-12.
90. Id.
91. I.R.C. § 316(a).
92. See id.
93. Senate Report, supra note 79, at 234, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
4871. The report indicated that the redemption in the example would be essentially equivalent to
a dividend "notwithstanding the absence of earnings and profits." Id. (emphasis added).
94. See id. at 234, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4871
95. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1970).
96. Id. at 309.
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could be characterized as a sale. 9 7 As a result, the Court was forced to
interpret this new inquiry, and reasoned that a transaction could be charac-
terized as a sale only if there was a meaningful reduction in the shareholder's
proportionate interest in the corporation.98 The conclusion that followed was
that a distribution will qualify as a valid stock redemption under section
302(b)(1) only if the meaningful reduction test is met. 99
a. Characterized as a Sale-Old or New
The Davis Court interpreted the legislative history underlying section
302(b)(1) as more than a mere reenactment of prior law.' 0 0 The Court found
that the inquiry had changed from whether there was a tax avoidance scheme
to whether the transaction could be characterized as a sale.101 A stock
redemption has characteristics of both a sale and a dividend, and one can
safely assume that stock redemptions were originally granted capital gains
treatment precisely because they could be characterized as a sale. 10 2 This is
clear because a capital gain is defined as the sale of a capital asset'0 3 and, by
granting stock redemptions capital gains treatment, Congress expressed its
belief that these transactions could be characterized as a sale.'0 4 This inquiry
does not evidence a dramatic change from prior law. Rather, Congress merely
articulated the traditional inquiry that originally motivated it to grant these
transactions capital gains treatment. Thus, the inquiry of whether the trans-
action could be characterized as a sale was not a new phenomenon. The
validity of the meaningful reduction test must, therefore, be determined.
b. Propriety of the Meaningful Reduction Test
The Court interpreted the language "characterized as a sale" as requiring a
meaningful reduction in the shareholder's interest in the corporation. 10 The
Court incorrectly assumed that the definition of "sale" implicitly excludes
transactions by a controlling shareholder whose interest in the corporation is
not meaningfully reduced. This is inaccurate because a sale of stock by
97. Id. at 311.
98. Id. at 313.
99. Id. at 313.
100. Id. at 310.
101. Id. at 311.
102. See notes 103-04 infra and accompanying text.
103. I.R.C. § 1222.
104. Stock redemptions were originally granted capital gains treatment because the Supreme
Court found that these transactions could be characterized as a capital transaction rather than as
a dividend. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221, 229-31 (19181. The Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1926
limited this general rule only when tax avoidance schemes were employed. Revenue Act of 1921,
ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 228-29 (current version at I.R.C. § 302); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27,
§ 201(g), 44 Stat. 11 (current version at I.R.C. § 302). This indicates that stock redemptions are
generally treated as capital transactions because they can be characterized as a sale or exchange of
a capital asset, and that the only time that they cannot be so characterized is when a tax
avoidance scheme is being employed.
105. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970).
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controlling shareholder to an independent third party will be characterized as
a sale and taxed accordingly even when there is no meaningful reduction in
the shareholder's interest. 106 In fact, the sole distinction between the sale of
stock by a controlling shareholder to an independent third party and such a
sale to his corporation is that in the former situation there is no doubt that the
parties are at arms length and have a valid business purpose for entering into
the transaction. In the latter case, however, there is some doubt as to the
parties' bargaining position and intentions. If the parties can show that, as in
transactions between independent parties, both the shareholder and the
corporation had valid business purposes for entering into the sales agreement,
the transaction should be characterized as an arms length sale. Characteriza-
tion of a transaction as a sale, therefore, necessarily requires the application of
the business purpose test rather than the meanilngful reduction test.
The meaningful reduction test is also inconsistent with the language in the
Senate Report which states that "[t]he test intended to be incorporated in the
interpretation of [section 302(b)(1)] is in general that currently employed under
section 115 (g)(1) of the 1939 Code.'10 7 Thus, Congress expressly provided
that the test to be applied under section 302(b)(1) was one that courts applied
under the 1939 Code-either the business purpose test' 08 or the strict net
effects test. 10 9 The meaningful reduction test is obviously different from the
business purpose test because in the former, the business purpose for the
redemption is irrelevant."10 The meaningful reduction test also differs from
the strict net effects test as it was applied under the 1939 Code because the
strict net effects test held only exactly pro rata distributions as essentially
equivalent to a dividend;"'I the meaningful reduction test holds even non-pro
rata distributions essentially equivalent to a dividend." 2 The Supreme
Court's application of a new test is therefore contrary to the express intent of
Congress.
106. Section 1222 states that capital treatment applies to the "sale or exchange of a capital
asset." I.R.C. § 1222(1). There is no provision changing this result if the redeeming shareholder is
a controlling shareholder who does not meaningfully reduce his interest in the corporation via the
sale.
107. Senate Report, supra note 79, at 234, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 4870.
108. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 54, 55 supra and accompanying text.
110. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 312 (1970).
111. See Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607, 609 (5th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v.
Roberts, 203 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1953); Boyle v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 557, 560 (3d Cir ,
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951); Smith v. United States, 121 F.2d 692, 695 (3d Cir. 1941),
Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
112. While in Davis the meaningful reduction test was applied to a pro rata distnbution,
United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970), post-Davis cases have interpreted the test to
hold even non-pro rata distributions essentially equivalent to a dividend. See, e g., Jones v.
United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9349 (D.N.J. 1972); Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 TC.
280 (1974), aff'd, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); Fehrs Fin Co- v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 174 (1972). aff'd, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 416 US_ 938
(1974). For a discussion of the courts' interpretation of the meaningful reduction test since Davis,
see Randall, Recent Interpretations of the "Meaningfid Reduction" Test of ILR C Section
302(b)(1), 1977 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 253, 257-74.
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c. Which Test Applies
Congress did not intend that both tests be applied. It painstakingly pointed
out that the inquiry into whether the transaction could be characterized as a
sale was the sole inquiry.' 13 Nevertheless, it remains to be determined which
test should be applied.
Certain stock redemptions will qualify as a valid sale under section
302(b)(1) if either the business purpose test or the strict net effects test is
applied. An example of this is a non-pro rata distribution for valid business
purposes.' '4 Other stock redemptions, however, will be essentially equivalent
to a dividend, regardless of which test is applied. An example of this is a pro
rata distribution without a valid business purpose for the redemption."'
Between these two extremes is a gray area in which the transaction has
characteristics of both a sale and a dividend."16 These transactions cause
much confusion because on the same set of facts the application of the
business purpose test will result in a characterization of the transaction as a
bona fide sale while the application of the strict net effects test will result in a
characterization of essentially equivalent to a dividend. 117 The only reason for
the difference in result, however, is the different starting point from which
the tests analytically approach the transaction.
The business purpose test assumes that a sale of stock by a shareholder to a
corporation can be characterized as a valid sale if the parties are acting at
arms length with valid business purposes when entering into the transac-
tion. 118 If the transaction can be characterized as an arms length sale, the fact
113. Congress attempted in the 1954 Code to eliminate the considerable confusion that existed
in the decisional law concerning whether a distribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend.
Jacobson, Corporate Distributions: Not Essentially Equivalent to a Dividend; Assignment of
Income and Other Problems, 33d Ann. N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1007, 1007 (1975). The courts'
split between the business purpose test and the strict net effects test caused confusion because, on
the same set of facts, they would provide opposite results. See cases cited notes 53, 54 supra and
accompanying text. It appears that Congress must have intended to adopt only one of the tests.
This was evidently the reason Congress included only one inquiry under § 302(b)(1). Senate
Report, supra note 79, at 234, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4870-71.
114. Under the business purpose test, the example would not be essentially equivalent to a
dividend because of the valid business purpose for the redemption. See cases cited note 53 supra.
Under the strict net effects test, the example would not he essentially equivalent to a dividend
because the distribution is not pro rata. See cases cited note 54 supra.
115. Under the business purpose test this example would be essentially equivalent to a
dividend because there is no valid business purpose for the redemption. See cases cited note 53
supra. Under the strict net effects test the example would be essentially equivalent to a dividend
because it is a pro rata redemption. See cases cited note 54 supra.
116. B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 22, 9.01, at 9-2-4.
117. There was confusion in cases in which there was a pro rata distribution for valid
business purposes. Under the business purpose test, there would be a valid stock redemption
because there was a valid business purpose for the redemption. See cases cited note 49 supra.
118. The business purpose test inquires whether there was a valid business purpose for the
redemption. See cases cited note 53 supra. If such a purpose can be found, then the
distribution will qualify as a valid stock redemption. Section 302(a) refers to a valid stock
redemption as payment in exchange for stock. I.R.C. § 30?(a). It can be inferred, therefore, that
under the business purpose test, a transaction can be characterized as a sale of stock if there is a
valid business motive for both parties in entering into the transaction.
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that it could also be characterized as a dividend is irrelevant, and it will be
treated as a valid stock redemption under section 302(b)(1)." 9 The strict net
effects test, however, approaches the problem differently. The analysis as-
sumes that a distribution can be characterized as a dividend if it is an exactly
pro rata distribution by a corporation to a shareholder without changing his
proportionate interest in the corporation.' 20 If the transaction can be charac-
terized as a dividend it will be treated as essentially equivalent to a dividend
even though it has characteristics of a sale.12 ' Because in this gray area the
transaction could be characterized as both a sale and a dividend, the only
reason these tests provide opposite results is that they approach the problem
from opposite starting points; the strict net effects test inquires only whether
the transaction can be characterized as a dividend and the business purpose
test inquires only whether the transaction can be characterized as a sale.
In the Senate Report, Congress expressly provided that the sole inquiry was
whether the transaction by its nature could be characterized as a sale.1 2 2
Congress affirmed the business purpose test approach and rejected the strict
net effects test approach. Therefore,the proper inquiry under section 302(b)(1)
is whether there is a valid business purpose for both the corporation and the
shareholder to enter into the sale agreement so that the transaction could be
characterized as an arms length bona fide sale of stock.
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
When the shareholder's and the corporation's business purpose for entering
into the transaction is apparent at the time of the redemption, the application
of the business purpose test results in capital gains treatment under section
302(b)(1). 123 Distributions in repayment of shareholders' financing advances,
however, need special treatment because, although there is a valid business
purpose for the transaction as a whole, it may not be apparent at the time of
the redemption.
119. If a valid business purpose is found for a transaction, the courts that apply the
business purpose test, will not hold that the transaction is essentially equivalent to a dividend
merely because it is also pro rata. See cases cited note 53 supra.
120. The cases which have applied the strict net effects test have begun their analysis by
stating that " '[t]he hallmarks of a dividend . . . are pro rata distribution of earnings and profits
and no change in basic shareholder relationships.' " Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811,
813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 834 (1965) (quoting Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815,
817 (2d Cir. 1964)).
121. These courts have held that the purpose behind the redemption is irrelevant in making a
§ 302(b)(1) determination. Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir.), crl denied,
382 U.S. 834 (1965); Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1957). Thus, these
courts have ignored that the motive of the parties in issuing and redeeming the stock may be to
obtain valid business benefits for each, a characteristic of a valid sale.
122. Senate Report, supra note 79, at 234, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad News
at 4870-71.
123. See, e.g., McFarlane v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 467, 468 (1954) (capital gains
treatment granted to redemption of stock in exchange for cancellation of debt owed by share-
holder to corporation when purpose of transaction was to improve corporation's credit rating);
Eberly v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157, 1165 (1951) (same); Monk v. Commissioner, 6
T.C.M. (CCH) 1015, 1016-18 (1947) (same).
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A. The Section 302(b)(1) Contribution
The proper approach for dealing with distributions by corporations in
repayment of a shareholder's valid business financing advance should recog-
nize a new kind of contribution to equity, termed a "section 302(b)(1)
contribution." This transaction has two central characteristics: a valid busi-
ness financing purpose for the advance 1 24 that is short term in nature. 121 If
the distribution has both characteristics, it should not be taxed as a dividend,
even if earnings and profits are present, because it is a return of equity.126
1. Business Purpose Test
The business purpose test is the proper one to apply in determining whether
a redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend under section
302(b)(1). 1 2 7 There has been, however, a dispute on the proper application of
this test. Some courts have looked only at the transaction at the time of the
redemption to ascertain a separate business purpose for the redemption., 28
124. In Part II, supra, it was determined that the valid business purpose test should apply to
§ 302(b)(1) transactions. See notes 113-22 supra and accompanying text. That test, however, is
analyzed and refined here, and it is concluded that its inquiry may have to be extended to the
time the advance was made. See notes 127-34 infra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 135-49 infra and accompanying text.
126. Section 301(c)(2) provides that the "portion of the distribution which is not a dividend
shall be applied against and reduce the adjusted basis of the stock." I.R.C. § 301(c)(2). In Albers
v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 474 F.2d 1338 (3d
Cir.), aff'g 56 T.C. 556 (1971), Justice Powell stated that "the redemption of preferred stock
provided petitioners nothing more than a return of [equity]." Id. at 984. The facts in Albers were
almost identical to those in Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970). In Albers, the shareholders advanced
funds to increase the working capital of the corporation so that it would qualify for an outside
loan which was to be used to replace a barge. Albers v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982, 982-83
(1973) (Powell, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 474 F.2d 1331 (3d Cir.), aff'g 56 T.C. 556 (1971).
The parties stipulated that the shareholders were to be repaid for their advance when the loan
was repaid and this in fact occurred. Id. The distribution in repayment of the shareholder
advance, in both Albers and Davis, would qualify as a repayment of a § 302(b)(1) contribution.
A § 302(b)(1) contribution should be distinguished from an ordinary contribution to capital, the
repayment of which is governed by § 316. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text. The
distribution by a corporation in repayment of a § 316 contribution will always be taxed as a
dividend unless there are no earnings and profits. Id. Section 316 defines a dividend as any
distribution by a corporation to a shareholder, but only to the extent of earnings and profits.
I.R.C. § 316(a). Section 301 provides that a dividend will be includable in gross income. I.R.C. §
301(c)(1). If there are no earnings and profits, the distribution will not be a dividend and therefore
will not be taxable. I.R.C. § 301(c)(2).
127. See notes 113-22 supra and accompanying text.
128. Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir. 1966); Ballenger v. United
States, 301 F.2d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1962). In United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 307 n.9 (1970),
the IRS argued that "even if business purpose were relevant under § 302(b)(1), the business
purpose present here related only to the original investment and not at all to the necessity for
redemption." Id. See also id. at 303 n.2. ("Even among those courts that consider business
purpose, however, it is generally required that the business purpose be related, not to the issuance
of the stock, but to the redemption of it.").
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Others have looked at both the time of the advance and the time of the
redemption to determine whether there was a business purpose. 1_9 Legislative
history supports the latter view. In the example used by the Senate Finance
Committee,1 30 the only business purpose stated was the actual advance of the
funds.' 31 There was no separate business purpose for the distribution. The
Committee clearly intended that this be a valid section 302(b)(1) stock
redemption. 32 It is contended, therefore, that although there must be a valid
business purpose for the redemption, it is not appropriate to limit the scope of
the inquiry to the time of the redemption. Parties often manifest their
intentions of a valid business purpose in the transaction as a whole. 13 3 While
there may be a valid business purpose for the redemption it may not manifest
itself to the courts if they irrationally assume that the redemption exists as an
independent event rather than as only one part of an entire transaction. 134
Thus, courts should inquire whether there was a valid business purpose for
the transaction as a whole.
129. Cobb v..Callan Court Co., 274 F.2d 532, 538 (5th Cir. 1960); Keefe v Cote, 213 F.2d
651, 657 (1st Cir. 1954); Davis v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 466. 471 M.D. Tenn. 19671, aftd,
408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 301 (1970); Smith v. Commissioner, 49 T-C. 476,
482-83 (1968); Estate of Golwynne v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 1209, 1212-13 (1956)
130. Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 332 (statement of Colin F. Stam).
131. The example stated that "Itihe corporation needs further financing, but it is too small
and new to get public financing." Id. No reference is made to the purpose of the redemption of
the stock.
132. The Committee first emphasized the tremendous hardship which the safe harbor
provisions of the House bill would cause for shareholders of small corporations that look to their
shareholders for financing. Id. It then changed the House bill by including § 302(blll Senate
Report, supra note 79, at 44, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4675. This can
only indicate that Congress intended advances made by shareholders to small corporations for
valid business financing purposes to be protected under § 302(b)1).
133. See, e.g., Albers v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting), denying
cert. to 474 F.2d 1331 (3d Cir.), aff'g 56 T.C. 556 (1971); United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301
(1970); Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954). In both Albers and Davis the shareholders
advanced the funds because the corporation needed financing for valid business purposes. 414
U.S. at 984; 397 U.S. at 302. It was understood by the parties that the funds would be distributed
to the shareholders in partial redemption of their stock when that business purpose %as fulfilled.
414 U.S. at 983; 397 U.S. at 302-03. Thus, the business purpose could be detected only if the
courts looked at the whole transaction. In Keefe, the court noted that the shares were originally
issued to the shareholder on the condition that they would later be redeemed. 213 F.2d at 657.
The court held: "Thus it could be found that there was a corporate purpose in issuing the shares,
and it could also be found that they were redeemed in carrying out that corporate purpose." Id
(emphasis added).
134. The facts of Davis illustrate this point. In Davis the business purpose for the advance
was the corporation's need for valid business financing. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301,
302-03 (1970). The shareholder, however, did not want to permanently invest funds into the
corporation. It was therefore understood by the parties that the money would be repaid upon the
happening of an agreed event. Id. Thus, the valid business purpose for the redemption was that
the corporation would not have received the advance it needed unless it agreed to the later
redemption. This, however, would not be evident if the court only examined the tranaction at
the time of the redemption. It becomes clear only if one examines the advance in conjunction with
the redemption.
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2. Short Term Nature
The second requirement of a section 302(b)(1) contribution is the short term
nature of the business purpose. While not mentioned in the section's legisla-
tive history 135 nor required by decisions applying the provision,' 36 this
additional element will maintain a logical pattern in this area of the tax law.
An example illustrates this logical framework. Assume that corporation X is
formed by shareholder A who makes a $20,000 contribution to equity.
Shareholder A also makes a bona fide loan to the corporation of $15,000. In
the first year of operations, corporation X earns $25,000 in earnings and
profits. The corporation has one bank account that now has a cash balance of
$60,000 of which $15,000 represents debt, $20,000 equity and $25,000 earn-
ings and profits. The corporation distributes $10,000 to shareholder A.
Under the current tax law the tax consequences of a distribution cannot be
determined unless the source from which the funds are distributed is known.
If the source is earnings and profits, the entire distribution is taxable as a
dividend. 137 If the source is equity, the distribution is not taxable because it
represents a return of capital. 138 If the source is loaned funds, the distribution
is not taxable because it represents the repayment of a loan. 139 When the true
source of the funds is a bank account which is composed of earnings and
profits, equity, and debt, however, the mere transfer of cash from the account
to the shareholder cannot logically indicate the true source from which the
funds were distributed. The tax law logically approaches the problem of
determining the source of a distribution by employing a two step process. The
first step is to examine the intentions of the parties at the time the source was
created. This identifies the character of the source. The second step is to
determine whether there is a link between the source and the distribution. 140
135. See notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
136. Neither the business purpose test, the strict net effects test, nor the meaningful reduction
test considered whether the funds were used for a short-term purpose. See cases cited notes 53,
54, 112 supra.
137. A dividend is treated as a distribution out of earnings and profits to the extent thereof,
I.R.C. § 316(a), and it is included in gross income. I.R.C. § 301(c)(1).
138. A distribution which is not a dividend will not be taxable but will reduce the basis of tile
stock. I.R.C. § 301(c)(2).
139. A distribution in repayment of a debt is tax free. Corporate Capitalization, supra note 15,
at 356.
140. Although courts have not expressly applied this two step process, the application has
been implicit. For example, in Albers v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982 (1973) (Powell, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 474 F.2d 1331 (3d Cir.), aff'g 56 T.C. 556 (1971), Justice Powell
noted that: "On the . . . facts it seems plain that the redemption of preferred stock provided
petitioners nothing more than a return of the capital they were compelled by the Commission to
pay into A & S to obtain the additional financing the corporation needed to remain in business.
To tax that return of capital at ordinary income rates is an extraordinary result." Id. at 984.
Justice Powell concluded that the distributed funds were part of equity rather than earnings and
profits. Id. To do so he had to apply implicitly the two-part test. He first analyzed the intention of
the shareholder at the time of the advance. He determined that, by its nature, the advance was to
be distributed to the shareholder when the business need for the funds terminated. When tile
funds were in fact distributed in close proximity to the termination of the business need, Justice
[Vol. 48
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For example, assume that in the previous example the loan agreement stated
that the corporation would repay the shareholder $10,000 on a given date and
that it did in fact do so. Applying the two step test, the first inquiry examines
the intent of the parties at the time the source was created. In this case, the
loan agreement clearly establishes that the loan source would be used to make
a distribution of $10,000 to the shareholder on a given date. The second step
is to determine whether the distribution can be traced by both time and
amount to the character of the loan source. In this example, the distribution is
made on the given day and at the established amount. The process thus
establishes that the transaction is a repayment of a loan. Accordingly, it is not
taxable.
Application of this two step analysis to ordinary equity contributions
governed by section 316, elucidates the reason for that section's presump-
tion. 141 Section 316 establishes an irrebuttable presumption 42 that if there are
earnings and profits, every distribution is made out of that source.' 43 In other
words, applying step two of the test, there can never be a link between the
equity source and the distribution if there are earnings and profits. If step one
is applied, it appears that section 316 assumes that at the time of the
contribution the parties intended that the funds contributed by the shareholder
as equity would never be distributed from that particular source unless there
was no other source available. It thus becomes evident that section 316 in
effect presumes that in every industry or business there is a minimum capital
requirement necessary for the corporation to continue its foreseeable ordinary
operations.1 44 This minimum capital requirement may consist of the long
term fixed assets, machinery, equipment, supplies and working capital, which
at the time of the advance by the shareholder, appear necessary for the
Powell applied step two and found a link between the equity source and the distribution. Only
through the implicit application of this two-part test could Justice Powell have concluded that this
distribution should not be taxed because it represented a return of capital.
In Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954), the court concluded that the distribution by the
corporation was to carry out the corporate purpose of repaying the shareholder for his prior
financing advance. Id. at 657. Here again, the court could not have concluded that the funds
were distributed out of equity rather than out of earnings and profits without implicitly applying
the two step test.
141. I.R.C. § 316(a).
142. B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 22 7.02, at 7-8.
143. I.R.C. § 316(a).
144. Schnitzer v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 43, 64 (1949) (advance held to be equity because
made for "essential equipment or materials needed in [the business]"), aff'd per curiam, 183 F.2d
70 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 911 (1951). Not all advances, however, are contribu-
tions to equity or to the corporation's financial foundation. In J.I. Morgan, Inc. v. Commissioner,
30 T.C. 881 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 272 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1959), for example, the court
found an advance to be debt because "[tihe original capital investment ... would have been
adequate to continue the operations of the business." Id. at 890. The courts have therefore
recognized that a central characteristic of an ordinary equity contribution is that the funds are
advanced for the purpose of purchasing assets essential for the continuous operation of the
business. If the purpose for the advance is not to purchase such assets, an argument can be made
that the advance is not an ordinary contribution to capital. In Morgan the taxpayer successfully
argued that his advance was debt. Id. There is no reason to assume that a taxpayer could not
successfully argue that an advance is a source of capital other than debt.
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business' continued existence. 145 This minimum capital requirement is in
essence the financial foundation of the corporation. When the shareholder
provided this financial foundation to the corporation, he intended that it
never leave the corporation. Rather, he intended that it perpetuate itself
within the corporation as long as the corporation continued its ordinary
operations.
The reason for the section 316 irrebuttable presumption is now clear; while
the corporation continues its ordinary operations, every distribution must be
out of earnings and profits. This is because the parties would never intend to
make a distribution from a source representing the very financial foundation
necessary for the corporation to continue its ordinary operations. Partial
liquidations14 6 fall neatly into this logical framework. In partial liquidations,
the corporation does not continue the ordinary operations that were foreseeable
at the time that the financial foundation was created. Rather the business
operations contract. 47 This contraction, if genuine and permanent in na-
ture, 1 48 creates a surplus in the financial foundation and a distribution by the
corporation can be traced, at least partially, to the surplus of the financial
foundation created by the contraction. Thus, the distribution would not be
taxed because it represents a return of capital.
Because of this "unspoken assumption" of section 316, it is presently
assumed that every advance by a shareholder to a corporation is intended to
be allocated into either of two sources: a bona fide loan source or an ordinary
contribution to the financial foundation of the corporation governed by section
316.1 4 9 It is suggested, however, that it is possible for a shareholder to
145. See Schnitzer v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 43, 59-64 (1949), aff'd per curiamn, 183 F.2d 70
(9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 911 (1951); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, supra note 22 4.04, at
4-13. Supplies and working capital should be included because a corporation could not operate
without at least a minimum supply of liquid assets. In fact, a safe ratio of liquid assets to
current liabilities is often said to be two to one. G. Welsch, C. Zlatkovich, & J. White,
Intermediate Accounting 1025 (4th ed. 1976).
146. "[A] distribution [is) in partial liquidation of a corporation if [it] is one of a series of
distributions in redemption of all of the stock of the corporation pursuant to a plan; or [itl is not
essentially equivalent to a dividend, is in redemption of a part of the stock of the corporation
pursuant to a plan and occurs within the taxable year in which the plan is adopted or within the
succeeding taxable year, including (but not limited to) a distribution which meets the require-
ments of subsection (b)." I.R.C. § 346(a)(1), (2).
147. A distribution will qualify as a partial liquidation if the distribution results from a
"genuine contraction of the corporate business." Treas. Reg. § 1.346-1(a) (1955).
148. There are three essential elements which must be met for a partial liquidation to be
genuine. First, it must be permanent in nature. Second, it must change the nature of the business
significantly. Third, there must be a substantial reduction in the corporation's net worth.
Jacobson, supra note 113, at 1024-27.
149. Courts have never held that a contribution by a shareholder is anything but an ordinary
contribution to equity or a valid debt. Even so, prior to Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), courts
sidestepped the problem by finding that a distribution by a corporation to a shareholder in
repayment of a financing advance was a valid stock redemption under § 302(b)(1) if a valid
business purpose could be found. See cases cited note 53 supra. In reality, however, the nature
of a corporate repayment of a shareholder's prior financing advance is equivocal, Although it
could be either a sale or a dividend, see notes 116-117 supra and accompanying text, it is In
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advance funds to the corporation, yet neither intend to create a valid debt,
nor intend them to become part of the financial foundation of the corporation.
Instead, it is possible that at the time of the advance the parties intended that
the funds be used only for a short term purpose and for a short period of time
and then be returned to the shareholder. This type of contribution, when
made for a valid business purpose, is the section 302(b)(1) contribution.
B. Application
The suggested approach will reveal a clear section 302(b)1 contribution in
some cases. For example, assume that a corporation enters into a two year
contract to produce specially manufactured goods and is thus required to deal
with a specific supplier. Because the supplier will not extend credit to the
corporation unless it improves its credit standing, the shareholder advances
funds to increase the working capital. There is an understanding that he will
be repaid upon termination of the contract, and he is in fact repaid at that
time. A valid business purpose for the repayment is clear when it is viewed in
conjunction with the advance. In addition, the advance is short term in
nature because the shareholder intended only that the funds remain with the
corporation during the term of the contract. The subsequent distribution can
be traced by both time and amount to the purpose of the advance. This
distribution, therefore, would not be taxed as a dividend, but would be a
return of equity even if there are earnings and profits within the corporation
at the time of the distribution.
There are situations in which section 302(b)(1) would not apply. For
instance, a shareholder may advance funds to his corporation to expand its
operations and purchase a building essential for its business. If the corpora-
tion makes a distribution to the shareholder while the building is being used,
the distribution would not qualify as a repayment of a section 302(b)(1)
contribution even if stock was exchanged. Although there is a business
purpose for the transaction, there is no link between the purpose for which
the funds were advanced and the later distribution. The advance is clearly a
section 316 contribution because the plan for expansion required an increase
in the financial foundation of the corporation.
The application of section 302(b)( 1) contribution treatment may not be clear
in some situations. Assume a shareholder advances funds to increase the
working capital of the corporation so that it may obtain an outside loan it
needs to purchase a building essential to its operations. Assume also that the
parties agree that the advance will be reimbursed upon repayment of the loan
and that this occurs. It is clear that there is a valid business purpose for the
repayment when it is viewed in conjunction with the advance. It is unclear,
however, whether the short term requirement is met. It could be argued that
the purpose for the advance was to obtain a loan that was short term in
nature and, because the repayment can be linked by both time and amount to
the purpose of the advance, the transaction should receive section 302(b)(1)
reality a distribution which on its face is no different from a dividend distribution The real
question is how to differentiate the distributions which should be taxed as a dividend from tho'e
which should not because they represent a return of capital. The suggested approach analyzes the
transaction to answer precisely this question,
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treatment. It could also be argued, however, that, in substance, the purpose
of the advance was to purchase assets that are long term in nature and that
the short term purpose requirement is not met. Under this view, the fact that
the parties' choice of short term debt as the form of financing the purchase
should be irrelevant. It is suggested that the proper analysis is in terms of the
financial foundation.150 If the shareholder intended to expand the operations
of his business, there would be an increase in the financial foundation of the
corporation. Thus, although the advance was used to obtain a short term
loan, the substance of the advance is linked to the long term nature of the
assets acquired and thus becomes part of the financial foundation. If the
shareholder intended to replace existing assets, however, there would be no
increase in the financial foundation of the corporation. Under these circum-
stances, the advance should not be linked to the replacing assets, but to the
short term loan because the purpose of the advance was to use short term debt
as the financing means to replace assets. 15'
The suggested 302(b)(1) contribution approach adequately covers a myriad
of situations and furthers Congress' intent in adopting the provision. It also
resolves the dilemma currently facing shareholders of small, credit risk
corporations, and fits into the logical pattern of the tax law.
Steven C. Joszef
150. This discussion assumes that the corporation is not undercapitalized and that the
financial foundation is sufficient to maintain the foreseeable ordinary business operations. If the
corporation is undercapitalized, the advance may have the general characteristics of a § 316
contribution and a redemption in repayment of such a contribution should be taxed accordingly.
151. If the financial foundation is adequate to maintain the foreseeable ordinary operations of
the corporation, it should adequately finance the replacement of obsolete essential assets. This is
because such replacement is an ordinary and necessary expenditure of operating a business. The
corporation, however, is not required to liquidate its assets to finance the replacement. It may
borrow funds as an alternative means of financing. Under these circumstances, an advance
made to qualify for an outside loan is intended for the purpose of using debt as the means of
financing and, if the debt is short term in nature, the advance will qualify as a § 302(b)(1)
contribution.
